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Plato, THE PRINCE and Corporate Virtue: Philosophical Approaches to Corporate
Social Responsibility
Colin Marks1 & Paul S. Miller2
Abstract
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) has been a topic of discussion within
corporate law and policy for over 40 years. CSR, in its broadest sense, explores what
obligations a corporation should or can undertake to further the goals of society.
Business academics have described four social responsibilities that any company has to
society: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic. The progressive advocates within
the legal academic debate surrounding CSR argue that a corporation should seek to do
more than just turn a profit; it should seek to make society “better.” However, by
seeking to make society “better,” the corporation begins to act more and more like the
state. This raises interesting questions about the role of corporations within society.
Ethical and political philosophy can help answer these questions. Much has been written
from the Utilitarian and Kantian perspectives of business management, especially from
the Law and Economics movement and its critics. In the context of CSR, this viewpoint is
often represented by a shareholder primacy norm, in which the allegiance of the
corporation is to itself and it shareholders. However, there is a third branch of
ethical/political philosophy which argues that social goals are best pursued by discussing
the kinds of characteristics people should have, especially the characteristics of rulers.
Two of the most important works that follow this approach are Plato’s REPUBLIC and
Machiavelli’s THE PRINCE.
Machiavelli’s THE PRINCE provides one paradigm for rulers. For Machiavelli, the
chief focus of the ruler is to ensure the survival of the state, which is done best by
ensuring his own survival. CSR’s usefulness to a corporate prince is that it allows him to
let his corporation appear to be virtuous, but gives him the freedom to act in the best
interests of the corporation and himself. In the REPUBLIC, Plato proposed that rulers owe
citizens more than survival; they must protect citizens from injustice. The wise ruler, the
philosopher king, recognizes that virtue is not only a means of doing good; it is a better
means of ensuring survival. Applying this rationale to the corporation as a ruler would
seem to support the progressive proponents of CSR. However, applying Plato’s
paradigm to the CEO and officers may actually support a shareholder primacy norm if
the corporation’s citizens are equated to the shareholders. On the other hand a
Machiavellian approach to CSR in particular and business actions in general could
strongly support a shareholder primacy viewpoint of business law.
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This article seeks to explore the aspects of CSR in light of Machiavelli’s THE
PRINCE and Plato’s REPUBLIC. These two philosophers sought to explain and justify how
the rulers of large, socially important institutions, i.e. civil government, operate for the
good or ill of those who live within them. As corporations are themselves similar ministates, akin to the city-states and poleis in the times of Machiavelli and Plato, and as
some CSR proponents seek to have the corporation take on many tasks that have, in the
past, been performed by the state, exploring CSR through these two works provides
useful insight. Our topic, however, is not the paths of justice in the ancient or
renaissance world, but whether these two philosophers can help us understand how CSR
can be applied today; perhaps even to warn us of its abuses or encourage CSR’s healthy
application.
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“Few men have virtue enough to withstand the highest bidder.”
George Washington3
I. Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), was debated long before the meltdown of the
economy in the Fall of 2008.4 As Robert Reich noted in 2007:
Over 80 percent of corporate recruiters say business school graduates
should display an awareness and knowledge of the subject. Hundreds of
corporate conferences are held on it annually. Tens of thousands of
corporate executives listen attentively to consultants who specialize in it
explain its importance. The world's top CEOs and officials, gathering
annually at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, solemnly
discuss it and proclaim their commitment to it. Numerous "social auditors"
now measure how well corporations have achieved it, and hundreds of
companies produce glossy company reports touting their dedication to it.
NGOs-nongovernmental organizations, with full-time staffs, Web sites,
newsletters, and funding appeals-develop codes of corporate conduct on
aspects of it, and rate corporations on their adherence to it. At least eight
hundred mutual funds worldwide say they are devoted to it. The United
Nations Global Compact, launched at Davos in 1999, enumerates goals for
it, and by 2006 more than three thousand firms had signed on. Great
Britain even has a minister for it.5
Of course, how to achieve CSR depends greatly on what your view of a company’s social
obligations entail. The famous economist Milton Friedman argued that if corporations
are making money, they are meeting their social obligations.6 However, many scholars,
identified as progressives, argue that CSR seeks more from corporations than profit
making.7 In the legal academic literature, these so-called progressives argue that CSR,
and the debate that surrounds it, recognizes that corporations can act for the benefit (or
detriment) of others beyond themselves.8 But CSR cannot be some sort of internalized

3

THE QUOTABLE POLITICIAN 223 (William B. Whitman ed. 2003)
See, e.g., Just good business: A special report on corporate social responsibility, THE ECONOMIST,
January 19, 2008; See Colin P. Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a
Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2009).
5
Robert Reich, SUPERCAPITALISM 168 (2007).
6
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, THE NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE, September 13, 1970.
7
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
261, 265 (1992).
8
See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate Conscience, 42
VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (2008)(“What is important, however, is what the CSR debate represents, i.e.
recognition that corporations have the ability to choose to engage, or not engage, in behavior that benefits
some entity, group, or individual other than just the corporation.”).
4
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code for corporate operations as corporations do not have an inner conscience.9 It must,
therefore, be a tool to be used by a corporation’s human agents.10 Progressive scholars
have argued that corporations exist to fulfill various social goals, and what those
particular goals are may be added to or changed as society wishes.11 At the other end of
the spectrum are those who urge a more Friedman-friendly approach -- that corporations
should act to the benefit of its owners, i.e. shareholders. This shareholder primacy norm
recognizes that corporations should do what is best first and foremost for its own interests
and CSR should be used to enhance, and not impede, that goal. But people run a
corporation.12 So whenever we are discussing corporate responsibility of any sort, we are
discussing the conduct of corporate officers.13 The question then becomes what might
influence these corporate officers to adopt CSR initiatives; that is, does CSR help
corporations survive and does the role of the corporation within society compel the
adoption of CSR initiatives despite the harm it may do to the corporation?14 This
question can be explored within the philosophical frameworks of Machiavelli and Plato.
In THE PRINCE, Machiavelli wrote of the need for leaders to appear virtuous, even
if they must sometimes act against such virtues.15 A Prince should appear virtuous so as
not to antagonize his subjects, as they might overthrow him.16 At the same time, the
Prince cannot let virtue stop him from acting when he sees threats to himself (and by
extension the state).17 CSR could be seen to be a means by which corporations can also
appear virtuous. The degree to which such a use is legitimate depends on the degree to
which one considers THE PRINCE to be legitimate.18 It is not too far fetched to envision
9

Id. at 1144 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 134 (3d ed. 2005)
(“[C]orporations are obviously not human. . . .[and] could act to ‘aggregate the worst urges of whole groups
of men . . . .’”).
10
Among the types of tool is might be: An ethics code (obviously), a “how to” guide for corporations to
manage their public reputations, or a means to create value thorough eliminating waste and discovering
new products. “Just Good Business,” THE ECONOMIST: JUST GOOD BUSINESS: A SPECIAL REPORT ON
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 5, Jan. 19, 2008.
11
Allen, supra n. ____, at 271.
12
Marks, supra n. _____, at 1144.
13
Id.; L. Friedman, supra n. ____, at 134.
14
The definition of harm in this context can be a whole discussion in itself. Is it just the short term
reduction in profits that might otherwise be present without CSR, or can longer term, indirect harms to the
society that the corporation is part of also be taken into account?
15
Niccolo Machiavelli, THE PRINCE 69 (Daniel Donno trans., Bantam Classics 1966, 2003) (1513)
[hereinafter THE PRINCE](Therefore a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities previously
mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them. . . .[H]e must stick to the good so long as he can, but,
being compelled by necessity, he must be ready to take the way of evil).
16
Id. at 70 ([T]he prince . . . [should] endeavor to avoid those things which would make him the object of
contempt or hatred).
17
Id.
18
As an example of those who believe it legitimate, consider MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI by
Anthony Jay. It presented THE PRINCE as a primer for how management should conduct itself. Jay did not
present his book as a means of acquiring power; instead he viewed Machiavelli as presenting the best
method for analyzing problems of leadership. ANTONY JAY, MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE LIFE 25. (“I have called this book Management and
Machiavelli not because it is based on Machiavelli’s arguments but because it is based upon his method,
the method of taking a current problem and then examining it in a practical way in the light of experiences
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today’s CEO seeing his survival and the company’s survival as one and the same.
Further, the paths to the upper echelons of corporate power are as varied as those of the
Renaissance Prince.19 All this is to say that the modern CEO might be well disposed to
act on Machiavelli’s suggestions.
A Machiavellian viewpoint, however, is probably not how some proponents of CSR,
particularly progressives, would like it analyzed. After all, CSR proponents want
corporations to act with the interests of stakeholders in mind as they pursue profits.20
Which philosopher, then, might present a competing vision to THE PRINCE? This article
puts forward Plato as the counter to Machiavelli. The justification for this lies in the
similarity of the culture of Renaissance Italy and Ancient Greece. Both were heavily
influenced by Homer.21 According to Homeric thought, the goods that should be striven
for are riches, power, status, and prestige–for one’s self and one’s country. The personal
attributes that allow a man to reach such goals are considered virtues.22 This is to say that
if being a good person was to seek the Homeric goals; the personal characteristics that
allowed one to reach those goals must be seen as good. The conduct of both the leading
figures of Fifth Century B.C. Greece and the Italian Renaissance clearly embodied this
viewpoint.23
But what happens when these virtues lead to disaster? This is what happened to
Athens after their defeat in the Peloponnesian or the near constant warfare in Italy during
the late middle ages and Renaissance. These are the times in which Plato and
Machiavelli wrote. Machiavelli’s solution was victory and order at all costs; a
reinforcement of Homeric ideals.24 Plato’s answer was radically different:
Unless philosophers become kings in our cities, or unless those who are
now kings and rulers become true philosophers, so that political power and
philosophic intelligence converge, and unless those lesser natures who run
after on without the other are excluded from governing, I believe there can
no end to troubles . . . , in our cities or for all mankind.25
of others who have faced similar problems in the past.”). But if his method is valid, so too must be its
conclusions.
19
THE PRINCE, supra n. ____, at Ch 3-14.
20
Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate
Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2006).
21
See Alasdair MacIntyre, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHICH RATIONALITY?, 13 (1988) (“Central to that body of
oral and written matter were the Illiad and the Odyssey. From Homer, therefore, Athenians had to begin.”)
and (Discussion of Ancient Greek impact on Humanism in Renaissance Italy).
22
Such virtues were referred to as aretē. These were virtues that allowed a person the courage to be
daring (andreia’) and knowing when to be cautious (sōphrosunē). MacIntyre, supra n. ___, at 26 (1988).
23
Some historic examples might be appropriate—perhaps Pericles and Alciabades in Athens and the
Medici and Borgia families in Italy.
24
With himself as Odysseus, to judge by his letters, See The Prince, supra note 7, at 4-5, (“Having read
this thing, they will see that I did not sleep of gamble away the fifteen years I engaged in the study of
statecraft, and anyone ought to value the services of a man who has become richly experienced at another’s
expense.) and dedications to Lorenzo di Medici Id. at 15-16 (“And if from your great height Your Highness
will sometimes cast a glance below to these lowly places, you will see how undeservedly I endure the
heavy and relentless malice of fortune.”).
25
Plato, THE REPUBLIC (Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott, tr., Norton 1985, 1996), 473c (p.
165). The numbering used for citations are the ones first put down by Stephanus (Henri Estienne) in his
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For Plato, it was (and is) the conduct of men that lead to bad results, and what were once
seen as virtues that govern their actions should be changed for new ones if disaster
results.26 Plato did not advance this argument naïvely; he was well aware of the
consequences such arguments could bring, but felt they had to be made.27
Our topic, however, is not the paths of justice in the ancient or renaissance world, but
whether these two philosophers can help us understand how (or whether) CSR can (or
should) be applied today; perhaps even to warn us of its abuses or encourage CSR’s
healthy application. Part II of this article is an explanation of CSR’s historic
development in both the business management and legal academic context. Part III
explains the relevance of Machiavelli and Plato’s works in a modern context. Part IV ties
together the paradigms set-out by Machiavelli and Plato with the legal academic
approaches to CSR. We conclude that analogies can be made between Machiavelli’s
view of power and the shareholder primacy norm and Plato and the Progressives if we
consider them at the level of the corporate entity. But, the people who actually wield the
power in the corporations may not in fact see their interests aligned with the shareholders,
and instead may be more like the foreign invaders that Machiavelli warned against.
Viewed from this perspective, the Machiavellian model may in fact be more in line with
how corporations are really governed. Such a model, however, has evaded description as
it mimics both the shareholder primacy norm at times, and the Progressive movement at
other times, but, under examination, should be embraced by neither the shareholder
primacy norm nor the Progressives.
II. An Overview of Corporate Social Responsibility
A. CSR is a name for various theories that present guidelines for corporations
to further a corporate and/or societal purpose.
Before delving too deeply into a discussion of CSR, it is useful, if not essential, to
review what activities are encompassed by the term CSR. What exactly does it mean to
be socially responsible as a corporation? Is merely obeying the law socially responsible?
What about choosing to go “green,” which also has economic benefits to the corporation
as well as society?28 Or is CSR just another way of describing corporate charity? How
one defines CSR is important as this has an effect upon whether an individual supports it.
The famous economist Milton Friedman’s view of CSR provides a classic example of
this.
1. Friedman’s view of CSR.

1578 edition of Plato’s works. They have become the standard numbering scheme for Plato’s works and
allow ready comparison of the text from different editions.
26
See e.g., Plato, GORGIAS, THE REPUBLIC.
27
E.g. Plato, APOLOGY, CRITO
28
Or perhaps seeks to simply obscure the corporation’s activities within a pleasant green veneer. See Joe
W. Pitts, III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J. LAW &
PUB. POLICY 334 (2009) (“The criticism of CSR as merely, or excessively, a public relations activity
represents the frustration some critics have with the pace of progress on the ground and insufficient or
counterproductive implementation of the concept.”).
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Friedman quite famously denounced CSR by stating that, in a free economy, “there
is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.”29
Based upon this quote, one could easily conclude that the thrust of Friedman’s argument
was to reject CSR as a legitimate business pursuit. However, a further reading of
Friedman’s essays on the topic reveals that Friedman’s definition of CSR was very
specific. To Friedman, CSR was nothing more than giving away profits to unrelated
charitable causes. If a charitable donation was in fact tied to some other corporate goal,
ulterior or otherwise, Friedman simply did not call it CSR. Indeed, Friedman seemed to
think it was dishonest to even label such giving as CSR, stating that he admired those
corporations “who disdain such tactics as approaching fraud.”30
A closer review of Friedman’s essays on CSR reveals that, though he may not have
considered it part of CSR, he did believe that corporations have responsibilities to groups
outside its own shareholders — to abide by the laws in place by governments as well as
by custom. As the above cited quote concludes, business has a responsibility to stay
“within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition,
without deception or fraud.”31 In another essay, Friedman expounds that the corporate
executive’s responsibility “is to conduct the business in accordance with [the
shareholders’] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in the law and those
embodied in ethical custom.”32 Thus, though Friedman was against corporate executives
giving away profits (unless so ordered by the owners/shareholders), if he was presented
with a model in which legal compliance was an aspect of CSR, he surely would favor at
least that aspect of it.
Many scholars take a broader view of CSR than Friedman. According to these
scholars, CSR includes an economic and ethical responsibility in addition to a legal
compliance responsibility. Yet, Friedman’s ire at corporate giving is not isolated.
Indeed, philanthropic activities are often included under ethical responsibility and are the
focus of much controversy in a number of academic circles.
2. Business scholars’ view CSR as encompassing a wide range of activities.
Business management literature has explored the topic of CSR.33 This literature
defines CSR as including a business’s responsibility to the wider societal good beyond
29

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2d ed. 1982); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN,
The Social Responsibility of Business, in THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 36, 36–38 (Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility].
30

FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra n. ___, at 41. As Friedman notes, however, he would not
advocate that corporations refrain from using the label CSR if it advantaged the corporation because that
would, in itself, be asking the corporations to engage in a socially responsible activity. Id.
31
FRIEDMAN, supra n. ___, at 133.
32
FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra n. ___, at 37 (emphasis added).
33
See generally Colin P. Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1272-75 (2009). As Cynthia Williams has noted, “[l]egal
academics have struggled to produce useful definitions of CSR, and in that effort may be well advised to
look to management literature.” Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1629, n. 54 (2006).
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the business’s economic performance.34 The model most often cited is that of Professor
Archie Carroll.35 In 1979, Carroll categorized CSR into four social responsibilities that
businesses have to society: economic responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical
responsibilities, and discretionary (sometimes called philanthropic) responsibilities.36
The first category, economic responsibility, represents the basic responsibility of a
business to be profitable.37 The second category, legal responsibility, represents the
responsibility of a business to operate within the framework of legal requirements.38 The
third category, ethical responsibility, represents the “responsibility to do what is right,
just, and fair.”39 Though ethical norms are embodied in both the economic and legal
responsibilities, this category embodies society’s “expectations of business over and
above [any] legal requirement.”40 The final category, discretionary or philanthropic
responsibility, represents society’s expectation that a business should assume social roles
above and beyond its economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities.41 This could include
making contributions to “various kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural
purposes.”42
Of all of the categories, philanthropic responsibility provokes the most debate
among scholars.43 While it is somewhat inaccurate to label something as both
discretionary and as a responsibility, Carroll maintained this category as a part of his
CSR conceptualization because he viewed society as expecting businesses to engage in
some discretionary activities.44 However, other commentators disagree on the
discretionary nature of philanthropic activities and instead subsume them under the
economic and ethical responsibilities, or as being an integral part, rather than a
discretionary part, of CSR.45 Thus, the debate appears to center on whether CSR includes

34

Matten & Moon, supra n. ____, at 405; Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of
Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. MGT. REV. 497, 497-98 (1979).
35
See Aviva Geva, Three Models of Corporate Social Responsibility: Interrelationships between Theory,
Research, and Practice, 113:1 BUS. & SOC. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (referring to Carroll’s article 1979 article on
CSR as a “foundational article on social performance.”); Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate
Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGT. REV. 166, 167 (2005)
(noting that Carroll’s 1979 model of CSR is widely cited).
36
Archie Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. MGT.
REV. 497, 499 (1979); Archie Carroll, The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, 100/101 BUS. & SOC.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1998); Geva, supra n. ___, at 5-7; Matten & Crane, supra n. ___, at 167.
37
Matten & Crane, supra n. _____, at 167; Carroll, supra n. ____, at 500.
38
Carroll, supra n. _____, at 500.
39
Matten & Crane, supra n. 24, at 167.
40
Carroll, supra n. _____, at 500.
41
Id.
42
Matten & Crane, supra n. ____, at 167. Carroll originally conceptualized these categories into a
pyramid, and though he claimed they were not mutually exclusive, they were ordered by their “fundamental
role in the evolution of importance.” Carroll, supra n. _____, at 499-500. As a pyramid, economic
responsibilities were at the bottom, topped by legal responsibilities, then by ethical responsibilities, and
finally, by discretionary responsibilities at the very top. Geva, supra n. _____, at 5.
43
Geva, supra n. _____, at 9.
44
Carroll, supra n. ____, at 500.
45
See Geva, supra n. ____, at 6, Table1 (explaining how intersecting and concentric circle models of
CSR differ from Carroll’s pyramid model).
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only, as its essential parts, the economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities or whether
CSR should also include philanthropic activities.46
Friedman rejected the concept of philanthropic/discretionary giving as essentially
undemocratic.47 He argued that when a corporate executive spent corporate funds on
charity, that executive spent the shareholders’ money, via the shareholder’s interest in the
corporation, for a general social interest.48 Thus, such an executive would essentially be
imposing a tax on either the customers, through higher prices, or on its own employees in
the form of lower wages.49 Friedman argued that this imposition of taxes and
expenditure of assets is a government function that should be left to the legislature to
impose.50 In contrast, Carroll’s hierarchy simply has philanthropy as a discretionary part
of CSR.
This optional view of philanthropic giving contrasts with a second view of CSR,
which is embodied in a growing trend suggesting that businesses have a responsibility
beyond their legal and ethical responsibilities.51 As one commentator has noted,
“[p]hilanthropy, which is usually understood as exceeding this minimum, appears to
serve as the distinguishing point between the neoclassical economic position and the new
widely accepted notion of corporate citizenship, which highlights the importance of
corporate giving.”52 Thus, this newer line of thinking appears to embrace discretionary
giving as an essential part of CSR, which may be subsumed under the other
responsibilities.53
3. Legal scholarship views on CSR.
The above debate mirrors an ongoing one within the legal academic community
over the role or the corporation within society. As early as the 1930s, Adolph Berle and
E. Merrick Dodd debated the idea that a business might wish to aspire to a higher goal
than simply turning a profit. Berle took the position that a corporation owes only a duty
to the shareholders to maximize wealth, while Dodd suggested that the corporation
should serve a social purpose as well.54 Dodd’s side of this debate has been described by
some legal academics as Corporate Social Responsibility or CSR. Thus far, legal
46

This concept is sometimes referred to in the business management literature as “corporate citizenship.”
Matten & Crane, supra n. ___, at 168.
47
Friedman, supra n. ___, at 38-39.
48
Id. at 38.
49
Id.
50
Id. Friedman also appeared to take the view that CSR was a very narrow category of giving that did
not benefit the corporation. Friedman was not critical of a corporation may engaging in charitable giving
when it provided an advantageous tax deduction or garnered good public relations but noted that it may be
hypocritical to term such giving as socially responsible. Id. at 41. Thus, giving that falls within one of the
other responsibilities (economic, legal or ethical) arguably appears to be acceptable corporate behavior in
Friedman’s view.
51
Geva, supra n. ___, at 9.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 6-9.
54
Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transactional Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in
International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 298–99 (2006); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L.
REV. 77, 81 (2002).
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academics have not uniformly defined CSR.55 As Professor David Engel noted, “[t]he
people who say they are discussing corporate social responsibility are by no means all
interested in the same questions, and they often seem to be talking past each other.”56
However, generally speaking, most seem to assume a definition similar to the one
assumed by Milton Friedman; that CSR refers to conducting philanthropic activities at
the expense of profits.57 This definition of CSR, as Jill Fisch has noted, is “characterized
by its view that corporations have obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders and the
public generally, and that these obligations include duties of fairness and morality that
extend beyond legal and contractual rules.”58 Thus the term CSR is often associated with
the progressive corporate law proponents, but this actually represents just one side of the
spectrum in the legal academic debate over the role of CSR. However, rather than argue
over how to define CSR, as the business management academics have done, many legal
academics have simply adopted a view that CSR proponents are advocating for the
progressive corporate law view-point.59 This progressive corporate law philosophy is
counter to the shareholder primacy norm which sees the corporation as the property of the
shareholders and views executives as owing duties primarily to the shareholders, with
little concern for non-shareholder stakeholders (except to the degree that it would affect
the shareholders). Though there are various shades of gray in the debate, for the purposes
of this article, we will focus our discussion on the shareholder primacy norm and
Progressive ends of the debate.
a. Shareholder primacy norm
At one end of the spectrum is the property conception of the corporation. The
corporation is the property of its owners, i.e. the shareholders. As the directors of a
corporation are elected by the shareholders, it is their duty, in directing the corporation, to
do so for the benefit of the shareholders.60 This sentiment was expressed most vividly in
the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.61 In Dodge, the plaintiffs, who were minority
shareholders in Ford Motor Company, brought suit against the directors to compel the
issuance of a dividend.62 Despite being in a position to pay generous dividends in
previous years, in 1916, Henry Ford, who owned 58% of the Ford Motor Company stock,
declared that no more special dividends would be paid and that the earnings would
instead be put back into the company.63 Henry Ford announced his motive for this
decision in a press release, stating, that it was his intention “to employ still more men; to
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them
build up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our

55

David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979);
Id.
57
See, e.g., id. at 9-10.
58
Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes To Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate
Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2006).
59
Arguably, the business management literature has a healthier view of CSR as including responsibilities
to make a profit which should be balanced with other responsibilities. See Marks, supra ____, at 1281-83.
60
Engel, supra n. ____, at 267.
61
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
62
Id. at 669.
63
Id. at 670-71.
56
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profits back into the business.”64 Based on this and other comments by Henry Ford, the
plaintiffs sued to enjoin Ford from expanding its operations by building a smelting plant
and to compel Ford to issue a special dividend.65 After a hearing, the lower court agreed
with the plaintiffs, enjoined Ford Motor Company’s use of the surplus to expand its
operations, and ordered a special dividend to be issued.66
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court announced in very clear terms to whom the
corporation owed its loyalties.67 In reviewing Henry Ford’s testimony as well as legal
precedence, the court stated,
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties
which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general
public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to
protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.68
Though the court reversed an injunction based upon the expansion of Ford’s operations, it
did affirm a portion of the trial court’s order requiring a distribution of approximately $20
million of the cash surplus, finding that even with some of the money being diverted to
the expansion of operations, the surplus was great enough that it was the directors’ duty
to distribute “a very large sum of money to stockholders” in the form of a dividend.69
Thus, the Dodge case demonstrates the duty of care owed by corporate directors, and has
been interpreted as equating this duty with a duty to maximize profits for the benefit of
the shareholders.70
This property model is commonly equated with the shareholder primacy norm, in
that it places the maximization of shareholder wealth above that of more altruistic
concerns.71 This conception of the corporation is most often aligned with the position of
Adolph Berle72 (of the Berle/Dodd debate described above) as well as with Milton
Friedman’s conception of the corporation.73 Indeed, Friedman considered it
undemocratic for corporate directors to expend corporate monies on charity, as that was a
role better left to elected representatives.74 However, this view is not necessarily limited
64
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to charitable contributions. Some scholars have asserted that even legal compliance
should be tempered by economic concerns. In a 1982 article by Frank H. Easterbrook
and Daniel R. Fischel, they urge, in a footnote, that,
managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws
just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance of these
laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of
how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the
idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not
only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.75
This view is not necessarily consistent with Friedman’s view, however, as even Friedman
noted that the responsibility to maximize profits was tempered by “conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical
custom.”76 Nonetheless, in the context of legal compliance, this focus on profits
demonstrates the heart of the shareholder primacy norm; though other stakeholders (such
as employees, customers or the community affected by the corporation) may have claims
based upon contact or other areas of the law, corporate law’s proper focus is upon the
interests of the shareholder.77
b. Progressives
In response to the shareholder primacy norm, Progressives advocate a broader
stakeholder model, under which “the corporation serves the interests of all the
corporation’s stakeholders, including shareholders, but the shareholders do not enjoy
primacy over other stakeholders.”78 As Professor D. Gordon Smith succinctly describes
this movement, “[w]hat rankles the progressives is that the descriptive claim [that
corporations usually operate in the best interests of shareholders] represents a state of
affairs they find repugnant. The primary item on the agenda of the progressives,
therefore, has been to change corporate law in a way that accounts for the needs of
nonshareholder constituencies.”79
Though the origins of the Progressive movement could be found earlier, Merrick
Dodd’s debate with Berle provides a modern source for this conception of corporate
purpose. Dodd stated that “[b]usiness—which is the economic organization of society—
is private property only in a qualified sense, and society may properly demand that it be
carried on in such a way as to safeguard the interests of those who deal with it either as
employees or consumers even if the proprietary rights of its owners are thereby
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curtailed.”80 This is not to say that the progressive movement in corporate law requires
corporations to become eleemosynary institutions. Progressives simply view the
responsibilities of a corporation as going beyond serving the shareholder’s bottom line.
Not surprisingly, Progressives reject the law-as-price theory promoted by Easterbrook
and Fischel, whereby corporations can weigh the consequences of conforming to or
violating the law and choose violation if the risks are acceptable.81
The progressive movement has been criticized by shareholder primacy norm
proponents as requiring corporate boards to serve two masters — both shareholders and
stakeholders. 82 Faced with such a choice, corporate managers inevitably must choose
one over the other—or even worse, neither. “[A] manager told to serve two masters (a
little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is
answerable to neither.”83 Shareholder primacy norm proponents would thus argue that
the shareholder primacy norm best serves the interests of all stakeholders.84
Perhaps in light of this, many commentators have adopted a middle-ground
approach to CSR. A common theme to this literature is the concept of “shared values” in
which corporations should strive to identify areas where they can serve both their own
interests and the interests of society as well.85 Indeed, one of the authors of this article
has elsewhere put forth a conception of CSR that would require a balancing of economic,
legal and ethical interests in any decision-making.86 However, a middle-ground is not
always conveniently found, and ultimately lines regarding the corporate purpose still
must be drawn.
B. CSR at the margins
In some areas, such as charitable donations, it is easy, or perhaps easier, to find
common ground between what is good for society and what is good for the corporate
bottom line. Indeed, Friedman appeared to think it hypocritical to recognize such giving
as CSR because it was self-serving to the corporation. As Friedman recognized, “it may
well be in the long run interest of a corporation that is a major employer in a small
community to devote resources to providing amenities to that community or to improving
government. That may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the
wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile
effects.”87 But despite Friedman’s reluctance to label such giving as CSR, modern
academics have seen this arena as one where CSR has the most potential.
80
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However, there are a number of areas where the goals of society are adverse to, or
at least do not necessarily align with, corporate interests. One glaring example is in the
arena of legal compliance. Should corporations, as Easterbrook and Fischel have argued,
weigh the costs of legal compliance with the risks of getting caught and the severity of
the penalty imposed? A hypothetical may help illustrate this point.
A Better Crop, Inc. (“ABC”) is a produce wholesaler with its headquarters in
California. ABC sells produce, such as lettuce, tomatoes, and other fruits and vegetables
to retail grocers. The primary pesticide used by ABC on its farms (and its contracted
farms) is XYZ, which has been the subject of recent studies regarding autism. Though
there is some preliminary data correlating the pesticide to autism, the evidence is vague
and no causal link has yet been shown. Nonetheless, in response to these studies,
California imposes a ban on the use of XYZ on commercial farms. However, the fine
imposed for violating the ban is small and it is doubtful that it will be strictly enforced.
Though ABC is concerned about the possible negative publicity should their abuses come
to light, the cost of switching from XYZ to another pesticide would increase the prices
they would have to charge for produce by 15%. If ABC went pesticide-free, they would
have to charge an additional 20% to account for the loss in crops. Both options will
likely drive down consumption of ABC’s products and hurt ABC’s bottom line. Should
ABC take the risk of getting caught, as it is still more profitable to use XYZ?
Such a hypothetical brings into stark contrast the contradicting goals of society and
the corporation. Accepting that society imposes such fines where it finds the conduct in
question objectionable, then should corporations, which owe their very existence to the
State in the first place, respect such laws? Or is the severity of the fine a reflection of
how reprehensible society finds the conduct? In other, words, if society was serious
about such abuses, would it not create a more severe punishment and stricter enforcement
provisions? However, even if this is true, could not the corporation, wielding its power
and influence, lobby to ensure a light fine or penalty so that the costs of noncompliance
are negligible?
This brings up yet another area where the diverging views of CSR are brought into
conflict. As Professor Jill Fisch has pointed out, the corporation, unlike the Holmesian
“bad man,” has the ability to ensure that its conduct is not illegal through lobbying
efforts.88 Under a shareholder primacy norm, corporations should use such lobbying
powers to benefit the corporation’s bottom line (and thus benefit its shareholders). This
power has come into even greater focus with the recent Supreme Court decision of
Citizens United v. FEC.89
In Citizens United, the nonprofit corporation, Citizens United (“CU”), produced
and distributed a movie critical of 2008 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.90 The 90minute movie titled Hillary: The Movie, was released in theaters and on DVD leading-up
to the 2008 election primary.91 CU was also approached to release the movie on pay-perview, with CU paying $1.2 million to do so.92 CU intended the movie to be viewed free
88

Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate
Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1608-09 (2006).
89
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
90
Id. at 886-87.
91
Id. at 887. Coincidentally, the movie referred to Clinton as “Machiavellian.” Id. at 890.
92
Id.

14

of charge,93 but doing so put CU at risk of running afoul of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which prohibited corporations from either using general
treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or from making “independent
expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any
form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections.”94 Thus CU sought
declaratory and injunctive relief from the Federal Elections Commission challenging the
constitutionality of the BCRA with regards to both the prohibition on this type of speech
as well as the disclaimer and disclosure requirements.95
The lower courts denied relief based upon stare decisis as the Supreme Court had
previously upheld the constitutionality of the BCRA96 in McConnell v. FEC97 and Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.98 On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
overturned McConnell and Austin and found the BCRA’s prohibition on corporate
political speech unconstitutional.99 Among the concerns raised by the government on
appeal was that allowing corporations to take part in such political speech would open the
door to corruption.100 The Court, however, was not so concerned based on the record
before it, stating:
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If
elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent
expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We
must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the
appearance or the reality of these influences. The remedies enacted by
law, however, must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law
and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule. An
outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection
period is not a permissible remedy. Here Congress has created categorical
bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo
corruption.101
The Court concluded that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”102 The Court did uphold,
however, the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements.103
This new holding brings into even sharper focus the power the corporation has to
influence government. As Professor Erik Gerding commented soon after the decision,
“[f]rom a pure descriptive standpoint, after the Citizens United decision, it seems
impossible to argue that these spheres [corporations and government] can be neatly
93
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separated. Corporations are not just playing by the rules, they have the right to participate
in setting them. Moreover, they may be the 800 lb gorilla in the room.”104 The problem
the progressive movement faces with regard to lobbying and free speech actions is that
the corporation has no ability, in and of itself, to weigh right from wrong and it is
questionable, in some circumstances, what does best advance societal goals.105
Ultimately, because of this lack of corporate conscience, the corporation must rely upon
its agents, i.e. the board of directors and its officers. Thus, in such areas, CSR comes
down to how those individuals view the corporate purpose and their roles in pursuit of
that corporate purpose. Thus a review of two classic works on the nature of power and
how it should or could be wielded can offer insight into the nature of corporate governing
and CSR.
III.
Corporations and Business Ethics of the Past: Plato, Machiavelli, and the
City State.
Given the corporation’s reliance on its agents, namely, the CEO, other corporate
officers, and the Board of Directors, it is helpful for CSR scholarship to determine how
corporate agents might use corporate assets, for what purpose, and what might influence
their behavior. Utilitarian theory, with its emphasis on maximizing “happiness,” together
with classic economic theory, has been important in providing ethical underpinnings for
the shareholder primacy position.106 However, most Progressive commentators adhere to
a more Kantian point of view, which focuses on determining what is “right” or “good”
objectively and then determining whether an action falls within that measurement.107
Both the Utilitarian and Kantian approaches are problematic. As is clear from the
discussion above, proponents of the shareholder primacy norm do not believe that CSR
adds anything meaningful, and is at best a distraction, at worst a violation of the fiduciary
duties corporate officers owe the shareholders. Likewise, the Progressive position
preordains that CSR, particularly its philanthropic aspects, should be followed. As
Professor Smith’s quote above makes clear, the notion that the pursuit of wealth for its
own sake is viewed as inappropriate, if not ethically reprehensible.
The Utilitarian/Kantian dichotomy, while useful, puts all sides of the CSR debate into
set positions.108 However, there is a third branch of Western philosophical thought which
argues that social goals are best pursued by defining characteristics people should have,
104

Erik Gerding, The Conglomerate Blog, January 23, 2010, available at
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/01/google-china-and-citizens-united-a-short-essay-on-power-andcorporations.html.
105
Fisch, supra n. _____, at 1603; Marks, supra n._____, at 1149.
106
GEORGE P. FLETCHER BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 144 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996)
(describing utilitarianism thusly: “The most common mode of moral reasoning in the Anglo-American
tradition is cost/benefit analysis – the “balancing” of competing advantages and disadvantages of adopting
particular courses of action.”).
107
Id. at 146-51, 149 (“In the end Kant’s moral teaching demands purity from all of us.”).
108
We understand that this is somewhat of an oversimplification of the dichotomy and that arguments
could certainly be made that Progressives also follow a global utilitarian model in that corporations should
maximize the happiness of society if it outweighs the pain inflicted upon itself. A full discussion of the
Utilitarian/Kantian dichotomy is beyond the scope of this article (we feel we have our hands full with the
narrower topic at hand) but feel it is at least important to recognize the link between these philosophical
schools of thought and modern approaches to CSR.

16

especially the characteristics of rulers. Two of the most important works that follow this
approach are Plato’s The Republic and Machiavelli’s The Prince. These works may
allow better insight into how corporate actors would and should use CSR. As a first step,
we need to address whether it is actually valid to compare the City-States of Ancient
Greece and Renaissance Italy with the modern corporation.
A. The City State and the Modern Corporation, A Comparison
1. The Problems of Governance
Both The Prince and The Republic are tracts of political theory. They are concerned
with the mechanics of government, namely, how should rulers rule. But why should we
look to them for guidance on corporate conduct? Corporations are, after all, creatures of
government, subject to governments, not governments themselves.109
The answer lies in the fact that corporations are created for the same purposes as the
city-state: as a “response to human needs.”110 Plato states that in nature each person had
to see to his own needs.111 Eventually, it was seen that it was better for a person to
concentrate his efforts on producing that for which he has a talent.112 Plato goes on to
explain:
Since each person has many wants, many partners and purveyors will be
required to furnish them. One person will turn to another to supply a
particular want, and for a different want or need he will seek out still
another. Owing to this interchange of services, a multitude of persons will
gather and dwell together in what we have to come to call the city or the
state.113
According to Plato, the scope and size of the city-state expands as new specialties are
identified and new groups of specialists join the population to meet the needs of those
who desire them. First, the basic necessities are met: food, shelter, and clothing.114 The
producers of these goods are further subdivided (weavers, shoemakers, carpenters,
smiths, and other craftsmen), then a network of distributors (merchants) is introduced, as
well as transporters.115 Eventually, the city state will become so large that very particular
specialists will be needed who are capable of protecting friends, guarding against
enemies, and have the wisdom to do so in all its aspects, not just on the field of battle.116
Plato calls such people “guardians.”117
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Machiavelli’s description of the rise of the state is also rooted in basic human need:
“for in the beginning of the world, the inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed for a
time in the manner of beasts. Then, as the population increased, they drew together . . .
the better to defend themselves.”118 In short, the state was formed to promote human
welfare. According to Machiavelli the leader of the state “must provide in such a way
that, in whatever circumstances, the citizens will always be in need of him and his
government. Then they will always be loyal to him.”119 As we all well know,
Machiavelli calls such people “The Prince.”120
For a compelling comparison of the ancient and renaissance city-state with the
modern corporation, consider Peter Drucker’s The Concept of the Corporation.
Drucker’s description of the purpose of a corporation closely aligns with Plato’s and
Machiavelli’s description of the state: “When we say that the corporation is an institution
we say that, like any institution, it is an instrument for the organization of human efforts
to a common end.”121 Drucker, like Plato and Machiavielli, considers leadership a
paramount concern:
[T]he large corporation is in no way different from an army; it must
have the equipment but also, as in the army, equipment is of no avail
without the functional organization of human effort. And like the army or
like any other social institution, the things that really count are not the
individual members but the relations of command and responsibility
among them.122
As with every other institution, the survival and successful functioning of
the corporation depends on the solution of three interdependent problems .
. . Of these problems, the decisive one, particularly in the corporation, is
the problem of leadership. . . . No institution can possibly survive if it
needs geniuses or supermen to manage it.123
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While this is admittedly a very cursory examination of the parallels between the modern
corporation and the city-state, it is clear that both the state and the corporation are
institutions created for the purpose of human welfare and face similar leadership
questions.
2.

The Comparison of the Governed

Given that there were no corporations in either Machiavelli’s or Plato’s era,
philosophical ideals regarding governing city-states and poleis provide us with the closest
analogies in terms of population and economic power.124 Indeed, the size of some
corporations dwarf even the largest of the city-states and poleis: Walmart employs over 2
million people world-wide125 and recorded $13.4 billion in profits in 2009;126 Microsoft
employs 88,124 people world-wide127 and recorded $17.23 billion in profits in 2009;128
Exxon Mobil reports to employ nearly 80,000 world-wide129 and recorded $45.22 billion
in 2009.130 While shareholder numbers for these corporations are difficult to ascertain
due to the constant trading of stocks, Walmart has over 3 billion shares outstanding,131
Microsoft has in excess of 8 billion shares outstanding,132 and Exxon Mobil has over 4
billion shares outstanding.133 Therefore, it seems certain these companies have thousands
of shareholders and perhaps even millions.
Compare these corporation numbers to those of the poleis and city-states during
Plato’s and Machiavelli’s time. Plato lived from 428-348 B.C.E. and though population
estimates from this time period are scant, data does exist for some of the poleis.134 For
instance, the polis of Mantinea, which occupied an area of roughly 295 km,135 did not
have more than 3,000 people as of 420 B.C.E.136 It has been estimated that in 318 B.C.E.
matters, listen to their opinions, and then decide for himself as he wishes. He should treat
these councils and the individual advisers in such a way as to make it clear that their
words will be the more welcome the more freely they are spoken. Except for these men,
he should listen to no one, but rather pursue the course agreed upon and do so resolutely.
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Megale polis’s population was around 65,000.137 And when the territory of Thebes was
conquered and razed to the ground in 335 B.C.E. by Alexander the Great, more than
6,000 men were killed, and the remaining population of 30,000 men, women, and
children were sold into slavery.138 Machiavelli lived from 1469-1527 C.E. and the
population data from his life is likewise approximate, but according to one source, the
estimated population of all of Italy in 1450 C.E. was only 7,500,000 people.139
According to another source, 50 years later the estimate was 10,500,000 people.140 As
Italy was not unified until 1861, these population numbers are distributed among as many
as nineteen autonomous regions.
B. Machiavelli’s Prince and Doing What is Necessary
It is important to recognize that Niccolo Machiavelli wrote The Prince with one
primary goal in mind—it was in fact a naked attempt to get into the good graces of
Lorenzo Medici.141 It was also a failure in that regard.142 It is often overlooked that his
advocacy for a monarchy may well have been more the act of a courtier than a reflection
of his political beliefs.143
Notwithstanding these caveats, Machiavelli’s advice is as relevant to corporate CEOs
as it was to Medici. Consider:
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Wisely pursued, the advice I have given above will make a new prince
appear to have been long established in his state, and it will bind him more
securely and more firmly to it than if he had actually been long established
there. The actions of the new prince are. . .closely watched. . .and when
they are recognized to be fitting and able, they win men over and compel
their allegiance more than ancient lineage does; for men are more taken
with the present than with the past. When they find themselves well off in
the present, they enjoy it and seek nothing more. Indeed, so long as the
prince does not neglect his duties, they will undertake to defend him in
every way.144
This was an explicit reminder to Medici that his family had only been back in power
for a very short time, and had conquered Florence with a Spanish Army.145 The
Florentines were not used to his rule and might decide to revolt again, as they had 18
years before. Such can be said to be similar for the CEO, with Directors and
Shareholders always looking over his shoulder. Follow my advice, says Machiavelli, and
you will thrive, and your state (corporation) with you.
The Prince is divided into three parts. The first part essentially lists all the different
ways a man may become a prince: through inheritance, through force of arms, by evil
means, or by religious office146 and is not germane to this article. The second part
concerns what a ruler should do to hold onto power once acquired.147 The final part was
an argument for what should happen next in Florence and on the Italian Peninsula.148
We will focus on the second part of The Prince, which is about maintaining power
and furthering goals, particularly the goals of personal and political survival. According
to Machiavelli, order is the only way to ensure social stability, and the key to order is a
strong ruler. One of his key points is that moral obligations should not stand in the way
of survival.
Many men have imagined republics and principalities that never really
existed at all. Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they
ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be
pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives
after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin, since there are so
many men who are not good. Hence it is necessary that a prince who is
interested in his survival learn to be other than good, making use of this
capacity or refraining from it according to need.149
144

THE PRINCE, supra n. 11, Chapter 24 (p. 89-90).
Id. at 3. The former regime, which Machiavelli was part of, had lost a war and been turned out by the
Medic dynasty. The Medici had backed the winning side in a larger war for control over Italy, and
essentially sought Florence as a spoil after an 18 year absence. Id.
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describing as it was on the perfect city that never existed. Machiavelli did not have any problems with
goodness as such. However, he did not really have much problem with vice either. To wit:
Everyone will admit that it would be very praiseworthy if a prince had all those above
named qualities that are deemed good; but since he cannot have them, nor devotedly
adhere to them, because human conditions will not permit, he must be sufficiently
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Machiavelli discusses two issues of relevance for the modern corporate officer:
Should the Prince be virtuous? And what should his spending policies be with regard to
virtue? Whether one should be virtuous, Machiavelli argues, depends on to what degree
it helps the prince, and through him, the state, survive and thrive. As he states:
How praiseworthy it is that a prince keeps his word and governs by candor
instead of craft, everyone knows. Yet the experience of our own time
shows that those princes who had little regard for their word and had the
craftiness to turn men’s minds have accomplished great things. . .
.Therefore a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities
previously mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them. Indeed, I
would go so far as to say that having them all and always conforming to
them would be harmful, while appearing to have them would be useful.150
At the same time, the prince cannot give into his appetites. He should always appear
to be, and actually be, virtuous, whenever possible.151 The prince should discard virtue
only when it is required, not because he can.152 The reason for this is straight-forward:
the prince cannot afford to be hated.153 If a prince is hated, then the population has no
reason for him (and by extension his state) to survive.
The activities of a prince are not solely concerned with following high moral
standards. At some point, money must be spent. Of course, there are necessary
expenditures - the government’s servants must be paid, defenses must be maintained, and
so forth. Yet, some spending is a matter of the prince’s discretion. Such spending has no
purpose other than enhancing the prince’s reputation. Machiavelli argues that the prince
must be careful with his money:
I say that it would be well to be reputed generous. Yet to be so generous
as to gain a reputation for this quality is harmful.…To be reputed generous
among men, one must indulge in every form of ostentation, with the result
that any prince who does so will have to spend all of his resources and, to
keep up his reputation, will have to burden his people unduly by resorting
to extortionate taxation and every other means of raising
prudent to avoid a reputation for those vices which would deprive him of his state and, if
possible, also avoid those that would not deprive him of it. In case he is unable to avoid
these last, however, he need not be overly concerned. Moreover, he need not be
concerned if he acquires a reputation for those vices without which he would be unlikely
to save his state. For, everything considered, he will find things which, though seeming
good, will lead to his ruin if pursued, and others which, though seeming evil, will result
in his safety and well-being.
Id. at 62.
150
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“Therefore, a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities previously mentioned, but he must
surely seem to have them.…That is, it will be well for him to seem and, actually, to be merciful, faithful,
humane, frank, and religious. But he should preserve a disposition which will make a reversal of conduct
possible in case the need arises.” Id. (at 69).
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Id.
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“Of all the things [the prince] must guard against, hatred and contempt come first…” Id. at Chapter 16,
(p. 64). “Still a prince should make himself feared in such a way that, though he does not gain love, he
escapes hatred….” Id. at Ch. 17 (p. 66).
It is interesting to note that Machiavelli sees the chief cause for hatred for the prince is seizing the
property of his subjects. “[A]bove all, he should refrain from the property of others, for men are quicker to
forget the death of a father than the loss of a patrimony.” Id.
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funds.…Therefore, being unable to assume the virtue of liberality so that it
will be recognized and yet create no danger, a wise prince will not object
to being reputed a miser.154
However, Machiavelli recognized that many notable rulers in the past, Cyrus,
Alexander, and Julius Caesar were seen as generous. The key, argued Machiavelli, was
whether the prince was spending his own money, his subjects’ money, or someone
else’s.155 If it was his or her subjects’ own funds, the prince must be frugal, lest he face
the choice of being either “poor and contemptible, or, to escape poverty, become[ing]
rapacious and hateful.”156 On the other hand, if the funds being spent are from another
source, such as bounty from pillaging and extorting conquered lands, then there is no
reason for the prince not to be generous, especially to his army.157
Machiavelli saw the prince’s ability to stay in power as a balancing act between doing
what was required to stay in power, but not doing so much as to be despised for it.
Ultimately, however, Machiavelli condones any action of a prince that keeps him in
power; only failure is unforgivable.158 In this way, Machiavelli mirrors much of Ancient
Greek thought, particularly that of 5th Century Athens B.C.E. prior to its defeat in the
Peloponnesian Wars. Machiavelli, it must be remembered, aspired for a prince who
could free Italy from its foreign occupation.159 Anything that could accomplish this
would, in his view, be seen as good and be appropriately rewarded by all.160 This is
consistent with the Athenian perspective that looked to external accomplishments to
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Condsider:
One could cite a host of modern examples and list the many peace treaties, the
many promises that were made null and void by princes who broke faith, with
the advantage going to the one who best knew how to play the fox. But one
must know how to mask this nature skillfully and be a great dissembler. Men
are so simple and so much inclined to obey immediate needs that a deceiver will
never lack victims for his deception. Of recent examples proving this, there is
one I will not omit. Pope Alexander VI never gave thought to anything but
deception and never lacked someone on whom to practice it. There never was a
man who made promises more persuasively or swore to them more solemnly
and kept so few of them as he. Yet his tricks always brought the results he
desired, for he knew this side of the world well.
Id. at Chapter 18 (pp. 68-69).
159
Id. at Chapter 26 (pp. 94-97).
160
Id. at 97
This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass, so that Italy after so
long a time may find her redeemer. I cannot describe with how much love, with
what thirst for revenge, with what resolute loyalty, with what tenderness, with
what tears he would be received in all those provinces which have endured these
foreign hordes. What gates would be closed to him? What people would deny
him obedience? Whose envy would oppose him? What Italian would withhold
his allegiance?
155
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indicate individual and societal excellence.161 In this view, if the end is met, any means
to obtain it are justified. The most important response to this is unquestionably Plato’s
Republic.
C. The Platonic Alternative
Since The Prince is a purely political tract, and The Republic a largely ethical one,
how can Plato be seen as responding to Machiavellian theory? To answer this question,
we will examine the similarities in the political situations of the two periods. After that,
we will examine Plato’s response to the Ancient Greek mindset (and by extension
Machiavelli).
1. Plato’s Greece and Machiavelli’s Italy
The Republic was written sometime between 380 and 360 B.C.E. in Athens. At that
time, the Greek city-states were in the middle of a century of intercity warfare. It began
with the Second Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.E, and ended with the loss of Greek
independence to Macedon in 336 B.C.E. after the Battle of Chaeronea.162 Within Plato’s
lifetime, he saw the destruction of the Athenian Empire and the weakening of the entire
Greek peninsula as Phillip II sought his own hegemony.163 Plato’s ultimate conclusion
was that, whether by base appetite or incorrect morality, the constant drive to victory, by
individuals or individual city-states with no concern for the consequences of ceaseless
war, was destroying his country.164 He wrote The Republic in part, to address his
concerns and propose a solution.
Machiavelli’s Italy, especially Florence, was equally war-torn. With the end of the
Hundred Years War in France in 1453 and the Conquest of Granada in Spain in 1492, the
rulers of those two nations turned to the Italian peninsula to fight proxy wars. In
Florence, Machiavelli watched the destruction of the old order with the invasion of
Charles VII of France, saw Savanorola’s extreme religious theocracy ended with an auto
de fe, the rise and fall of an oligarchical republic (for which Machiavelli served as
Secretary to the Second Chancery of the Signoria) under Pier Soderini, and the return of
the Medici at the head of a Spanish army.165 What happened in Florence was going on
elsewhere in the Peninsula, and Machiavelli saw Italy as “more enslaved than the
Hebrews, more servile than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, leaderless,
disordered, beaten, despoiled, bruised, trampled, subject to every kind of injury.”166
2. The Republic
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The Republic and The Prince, then, both arose from times of extreme social
instability. Yet the authors came up with very different solutions. Plato argued that,
contrary to common belief, tough times do not require “tough” leaders, but that such
leaders are actually responsible for the hardships of the populace. Machiavelli, as already
discussed, argued that it would be best for a leader to establish himself in power and then
devote his energies to staying there, as stability would be better for the populace at large
than the chaos of constant upheaval.167
In Book I of The Republic, Socrates is attending a religious festival and visits the
home of an old friend.168 Through his dialogue with his companions, Socrates proposes
the following theory: the unjust man will harm both the just and the unjust in pursuit of
his own gains, while the just man harms only the unjust who would harm others or
himself.169 He further argues that injustice can never be profitable, as those who are
unjust cannot help but to conduct their lives badly, while those who are just govern their
lives well, and by extension, live well.170
In Book II of The Republic, Plato begins to address directly the issues that
Machiavelli would later raise in The Prince. Here, Socrates is confronted by Glaucon and
Adeimantus, who present arguments about the type of person who is successful in
becoming a leader of the city. Consider the following in light of our discussion of The
Prince:
Perfect Injustice denotes the perfectly unjust man. . .He must be allowed
to enjoy the greatest reputation for justice all the while he is committing
the greatest wrongs. If by mistake any of his misdeeds should become
known, he must be endowed with ample powers of persuasion so that he
can cover them up. Should he need to use force, let him do so with
boldness and manly strength–and by mobilizing friends and money.171
You know well how fathers lecture theirs sons (and guardians their
charges) about man’s obligation and also how they use words that
compliment not justice but the good repute that comes with it. They
calculate that a reputation for justice will gain a man public office and
fortunate alliances and all the things that Glaucon already said would
accrue to the unjust man who wears the cloak of righteousness.172
These arguments on the success of the unjust man were presented as a goad to
Socrates, to dare him to respond to the success of figures who had brought Athens and
Greek society as a whole into crisis.173
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Id. at Chapter 24 (pp. 89-90).
THE REPUBLIC, supra n. ____, at 327 (p. 26).
Id. at 350d-354b (p. 48-52).
Id. at 353d-358a (p. 52).
THE REPUBLIC, supra n. _____, at 361a-b (p. 56-57).
Id. at 363a (p. 58).
Id. at 367c-d (p. 63)
You have said that justice belongs to that highest class of good things which not only
produce good effects but which are, above all, valuable in themselves.…So tell us how
justice benefits a man intrinsically, and in the same way how injustice harms him. Let
others praise or blame the respective rewards and reputations.…I repeat, then, disregard
outward appearances, and prove to us that justice is better than injustice by showing us
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Socrates, as described by Plato, was up to the challenge. However, he goes about
making his argument in a less than direct route. If the question is, “what is the just or
unjust man?”, Socrates says that we should first determine what makes a just or unjust
city, on the theory that we may “read the large letters first then check the smaller letters
against them to see if they correspond.”174
For Plato, the ruler epitomized by Machiavelli’s prince was the embodiment of the
worst possible person, the tyrant. The tyrant, according to Plato, arises when people,
fearing the loss of their goods in the face of a perceived evil, choose a protector.175 This
is much the role that Machiavelli sees the prince playing.176 However, Plato views the
arrival of the tyrant not as a good, but as the final disaster.177 Rather than protecting the
people, he enslaves them, takes all steps necessary to secure his power and feed his
appetites, and in the search for new conquests create pretexts to make war, thus making
the very people who chose him even less safe than before.178 Unlike Machiavelli’s
prince, having secured power the tyrant is unconcerned with even the appearance of
virtue, since he views his subjects as potential threats to his rule.179
the effects each has on a man’s should and how and why each effect can properly be
called good or evil.
174
Id. at 368d (p. 64).
175
THE REPUBLIC, supra n. _____, at 565c-d (p. 256).
176
THE PRINCE, supra n. ____ at Chapter 26 (p. 97).
This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass, so that Italy, after so long a time,
may find her redeemer. I cannot describe how much love, with what thirst for revenge, with
what resolute loyalty, and what tenderness, with what tears he would be received in all those
provinces which have endured these foreign hordes. What gates would be closed to him?
What people would deny him obedience? Whose envy would oppose him? What Italian
would withhold his allegiance? This barbarian domination stinks in everyone’s nostrils. Let
your illustrious house take up this task, then, with that boldness and with that hope which is
reserved to just enterprises, so that this nation may be ennobled under you banner and so that
under your auspices the words Petrarch wrote may come true: Against barbarian rage, Virtue
will take the field; then short the fight; True to their lineage, Italian hearts will prove their
Roman might.
177
THE REPUBLIC, supra n. ___ at 569b-c (p. 261).
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Id. at 565d-568d (p 257-261). Plato even observed that the tyrant would no doubt attract poets and
other people capable of persuading others of the advantages of the tyrant’s system. Id. at 568a-c (p.260).
Machiavelli’s championing of Cesare Borgia looks perhaps even worse is such light. See THE PRINCE,
supra n. _____, at _____.
Another aspect of the Tyrant, and a very important one for Plato, is that the Tyrant’s appetites do not
bring him satisfaction. Instead, they increase anxiety, for the Tyrant believes all share his approach and is
always fearful of the next Tyrant. So just like the Prince, the Tyrant pays intense attention to those who he
rules. But not to appease them, but to locate threats. This is why Plato believes that the unjust man, of
with the Tyrant is the paramount example, cannot be happy. Id.
179
Id.
It is a fair question as to whether the Tyrant would be happier and less insecure were he to have The
Prince to examine. At first, a distinction can be made that between the Tyrant and the Prince are those
appetites. For Machiavelli, a Prince is focused on stability, and he cannot be seen as giving his desires free
reign less it threaten his rule. THE PRINCE, supra n. ___, at Ch. 18 (p. 68-69). He would agree that the
Tyrant’s rule cannot last because his appetites will cause him to be hated.
Machiavelli’s argument, for Plato, falls apart because of Machiavelli’s insistence that the only art that
the Prince should be concerned with are the military ones. Id. at _____. Such a training, however, simply
replicates the Homeric insistence on winning and personal excellence being one and the same. E.g., THE
REPUBLIC, supra n. ____, at 390-391c (pp. 87-88) (Where Socrates asserts that the actions ascribed to
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So how is the city to avoid the injustice personified by the tyrant? In a word:
education. For Plato, education was the crucial component for justice: educate citizens
properly, and the ruler (who comes from the citizens, and is sometimes directly chosen by
them) will be just as a matter of habit.180 This is especially important because Plato felt
that a guardian must be “high spirited,” a person who actually wants to lead and have
others follow him.181 Plato was aware such high spirits can cause people to be “quicktempered and savage with one another.”182 Therefore, there must be some means by
which rulers can learn to be “fierce to their enemies but gentle to their friends” lest they
“destroy one another before their enemies ever get at them.”183 In order to know when to
be fierce and when to be gentle, a ruler must be a lover of learning, a philosopher.184
This makes education a vital component for a just society, because it is only through
education that justice can be nurtured within each individual.185
Achilles in the Illiad cannot have been those a virtuous person, despite Homer’s insistence otherwise). The
Tyrant’s appetites arise, in part, because of that training. Instead, and this is the crucial point for Plato, it is
the education that a ruler receives beyond the purely military ones, that create an excellent ruler. It is not
enough that rulers know how to fight. The ruler must also be philosopher, which is to say, a person who is
concerned with, and the training to be able, to find out the truth.
180
Id. at 473c-e (p. 165)
Unless philosophers become kings in our cities, or unless those who are know kings and
rulers become true philosophers, so that political power and philosophic intelligence
converge, and unless those lesser natures who run after one without the other are excluded
from governing, I believe there can be no end to troubles, my dear Glacon, in our cities or for
all mankind. Only then will our theory of the state spring to life and see the light of day, at
least to the degree possible.
181
Id. at 375b (p. 71).
182
Id.
183
Id. at 375c (p. 71).
184
Id. at 376b-c (p.72)
Do you not see that knowing and not knowing are the sole criteria the dog uses to distinguish
friend from enemy? Does it not follow that any animal that verifies his likes and dislikes by
the test of knowledge and ignorance must be a lover of learning?
Oh, indeed.
And is not the love of learning the same as the love of wisdom which, in turn, is
philosophy?
All are identical.
Then let us be bold. Having made the case for the dog, let us make the case for the man
as well: he who is gentle to his friends and to those he knows must by nature be a philosopher.
185
Id. at 376c-d (p. 72)
But now comes the question of his upbringing and education. How shall we manage them?
Is this question not germane to the principle objective of our inquiry, namely, the origin and
role of justice and injustice in the city? Of course, we do not want to be tedious by
prolonging the argument beyond a reasonable length. Neither, however, do we want to omit
anything essential to our discussion.
The question of education is clearly relevant to our inquiry.
The question of the educations curriculum was equally important for Plato:
Then you will understand that the most important part of any work is its beginning. This is
especially true for the education of young children. At this tender age they are the most
impressionable and therefore most likely to adopt any and all models set before them.
True.
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It is within his discussion of the ideal educational curriculum, and the exclusion of the
heroic poems from it, that Plato presents the characteristics of the just ruler and the just
society: a ruler must be able to identify a wrong and not excuse it because it was the
action of a god or other powerful figure;186 restraint cannot be abandoned in order to
punish wrongdoing;187 oaths and treaties (which had the force of law in Ancient Greece),
once taken, should be followed;188 be courageous;189 be truthful unless there is a
legitimate public good, such as deceiving enemies, for a lie;190 be moderate in all
conduct, especially those concerning bodily appetites;191 and do not let the desire for
wealth get in the way of doing what is proper and humane.192 It is important to note here
that, according to Plato, it is the combination of all these characteristics that lead to
justice; justice does not exist on its own.
The fact that Plato targeted the heroic myths is especially crucial to the discussion of
CSR and business ethics in general. Plato quite deliberately wanted to have stories of bad
conduct by powerful people excluded because of the tendency to glorify such behaviors
simply because they are done by the powerful. It was his belief that rather than serving
as cautionary tales, such stories instead became examples to be emulated.193 At a time
when powerful business people are referred to as “Masters of the Universe,” Plato’s
argument here resonates.
IV. Corporate Virtue: The Fate Of CSR at the Hands of Philosophy.
Having examined The Prince and The Republic, it now comes time to apply them to
CSR and the modern corporation. When examined in terms of the self-preservation of
the corporate entity, Machiavellian concepts support the shareholder primacy norm while
Plato’s ideas could be argued as landing on the side of the Progressives. What seems
equally clear, however, is that examples support each models’ approach to CSR as
making good business sense—it all depends on what particular situation a company finds
itself in. However, when the analysis shifts to how those who manage the corporation
Then we can hardly afford to let the children listen to just any tales or fables recounted by
just any teachers who happen along. We surely don’t want the children to adopt opinions and
beliefs that might be largely contrary to the kinds of values we deem desirable for them to
have when they become adults.
Id. at 377a-b (p. 73).
186
Id. at 378b (p. 74).
187
Id.
188
Id. at 379e (p. 76).
189
Id. at 386a (p. 82).
190
Id. at 389b-c (p. 85).
191
Id. at 389d-e (p. 86).
192
Id. at 390e (p. 87).
193
See id. at 378b-c (p. 74), 388d (p. 85), 391e (p. 88).
Plato’s discussion of Achilles’ conduct in the Illiad provides a good example of his concern.
That Achilles actually did all these things is something we must not believe. We shall
reject the charges that he dragged Hector’s body around the tomb of Paroclus and slew living
victims on the funeral pyre. We must not suffer our youth to suppose that Achilles, pupil of
most wise Chiron–Achilles, son of a goddess and of Peleus, the most chaste of men and
grandson of Zeus–could be so at odds with himself as to suffer from two contradictory
maladies: greed such as becomes no free man and a brazen arrogance towards both gods and
men.
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utilize CSR, it appears that management can (and do) adopt either of these two
positions—a shareholder primacy norm or a Progressive stance—to support the decisions
made. Thus, corporate managers may be operating under a Machiavellian model that is
not embodied by either of these two legal approaches to CSR, but which mimics them as
a justification to achieve a self-interested result.
A. The Prince, Shareholder Primacy, and CSR.
There is a direct correlation between The Prince and CSR. As the prince has absolute
power, any action he takes is discretionary—he has no obligation to follow the law
because he is the law. Some proponents of the shareholder primacy norm, such as
Easterbrook and Fischel, take a similar position, arguing that any obligation to comply
with a law is simply a question of balancing the costs and benefits of following that law
against the gains to be made by breaking it.194 For a princely CEO following
Machiavelli, the first issue must be whether CSR should, in fact, be followed as corporate
policy. And the Machiavellian position is clear, it is the survival of the corporation that is
paramount. Thus, while Machiavelli clearly instructs that virtue should not stop the
corporation from pursuing its own interests, neither should the absence of virtue condemn
it.
Looking to the progressive side of CSR, Machiavelli’s prince would not approve.
More than likely, the prince would find such expenditures as wasteful, devoted more to
the appearance of propriety rather than actually benefitting the company. If so, then such
activities must cease if the current management is to continue. And there are examples
that bear this out:
Cummins Engine, one of the pioneers of the corporate social responsibility
movement, had to abandon its paternalistic employment policies and its
generous contributions to its communities when its investors demanded
higher returns. Dayton Hudson, another notably socially responsible
company, came close to being swallowed up in a hostile takeover during
the 1980s, and has since then paid exclusive attention to its customers and
investors. Levi Strauss, also once on everyone's list of America's most
socially responsible companies in part because of its commitment to
source its clothing from domestic manufacturers, faced plummeting sales
in the 1990s and had to eliminate its remaining domestic production.
Polaroid, another pioneer, filed for bankruptcy in 2001. The shares of
Britain's retailer Marks & Spencer, which had ranked near the top in a
survey of worldwide labor standards, performed so poorly the firm
attracted a hostile takeover bid in 2004. Both Body Shop International
and Ben & Jerry's had been touted as among the nation's most socially
responsible companies until investor pressure pushed Body Shop founder
Anita Roddick into an advisory role and Ben & Jerry's was taken over by
Unilever.195
Furthermore, corporate officers seem to follow Machiavelli’s, and Friedman’s, advice
with regard to spending corporate assets. According to Robert Reich:
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The only legitimate reason for a corporation to be generous with its
shareholders' money is to burnish its brand image, and such a rationale
will go only so far. In Katrina's aftermath, Wal-Mart's [CEO] Scott was
candid about the limits of his firm's generosity. "We can't send three trailer
loads of merchandise to every group that asks for it," he said, turning
down a request for two thousand blankets. "We have to, at the end of this,
have a viable business." Charitable giving by corporations is infinitely
small compared to what the public sector dispenses.196
So, when faced with the possibility of failure, corporate officers seemingly appear ready
to follow Machiavelli’s advice to do whatever is necessary to ensure their personal
survival, which would, arguably, also insure the survival of their companies. In other
words, following the shareholder primacy norm would make Machiavellian sense as well
as good business sense.
B. The Republic, Progressives, and CSR
Despite the litany of bad results from its practice, noted above, CSR retains vitality
within the mindset of those concerned with corporate policy. As Cynthia Williams has
noted, “major global companies are increasingly involved in various CSR initiatives that
suggest a burgeoning sense of social obligation that goes beyond ‘mere’ law.…Thus,
over the past five years, initiatives have proliferated that aim to increase social and
environmental transparency, accountability and adherence to particularized standards of
substantive social and environmental conduct.”197 What accounts for this continued
willingness on the part of corporate officers to engage in activities that take money away
from the corporation and its shareholders? A simple explanation would be that it’s the
right thing to do. For example, the Dutch logistics company TNT, sent company
resources and people into two dozen natural disasters between 2002 and 2007, including
the Asian Tsunami of 2004.198 When asked why it does this, Luis Oelrich, the Director
of TNT’s Moving the World program responded, “People feel this is a company that does
more than take care of the bottom line …It's providing a soul to TNT.”199 Google, the
search engine giant, incorporated the slogan “Don’t Be Evil” as part of its corporate
identity and backs it up with an open-ended set of employee policies.200
It is the Platonic ideal that is at work here. Plato advocated for rulers of high virtue
not because such virtues were good in themselves, but because such rulers would see to it
that Athens would survive and thrive.201 More and more corporations are doing good, but
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part of the motivation is a desire to do well as companies. TNT, mentioned above,
partners with one of its most important customers, the United Nation’s World Food
Program (“WFP”), in intervening in disasters.202 This connection allows it to be more
efficient in dealing with the WFP in its commercial activities, and it also acts as an
incentive to recruit top talent.203 Coca-Cola, the world’s largest beverage company, has
targeted preserving the world’s freshwater supply, something vital to its survival as a
company, as well as to the survival of its customers.204 Seventh Generation is a $150
million maker of environmental household products whose entire corporate purpose is to
help its customers buy sustainable goods—yet when the company went public, brokers
promoted it because it was a good investment, pure and simple.205
Such lofty sentiments as environmental protection also provide opportunities for
businesses to save money by cutting waste and being more efficient. Many of these
business practices are simple to implement such as encouraging supermarket customers
to bring reusable bags (instead of being supplied with free plastic ones) and turning off
computers when leaving for the day to reduce overhead costs.206 Furthermore, the desire
to reduce a company’s carbon footprint, without reducing profits, has yielded new
approaches which reduce carbon emissions while increasing efficiency.207 Even more
important, the desire to be environmentally conscious can lead companies to find new
products to sell.208
It would seem, then, that an impasse has been reached. Machiavelli’s and Plato’s
ideals, applied at the company level, appear to lead to business success equally. This
would seem to suggest that whether a company follows all or part of a CSR agenda
depends in part on the actual business conditions in which a company finds itself. But,
again, companies do not exist as freestanding entities. They are dependent on people.
C. Machiavellian Corporate Officers and Platonic Corporate Guardians.
So far, we have presented corporate managers as the princes of the corporation. But a
key component of Machiavelli, especially for those who seek business advice from him,
is that he describes the world as he sees it, not as he wishes it to be.209 With this in mind,
are corporate managers Machiavelli’s princes, or are they one of the foreign invaders that
Machiavelli so desperately wanted thrown out — invaders who use the country’s
resources for the benefit of his own foreign country (or himself)? Consider that the
Renaissance prince really did have his life on the line should he lose his throne. At best,
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a fallen prince faced poverty and exile, much as Machiavelli did. But someone such as a
CEO isn’t in this position. Today’s “golden parachutes” generally guarantee a huge
financial windfall for a fired CEO. Furthermore, executive compensation in the forms of
salary, bonus, and stock options all come from funds that otherwise would go to company
operations, or the shareholders. Thus, while the prince’s fortunes are directly related to
and dependent upon the wealth of his state, the CEO’s or director’s priorities are not
always so directly aligned and can at times actually be considered to conflict with the
corporation’s priorities.
Therefore, if the corporate managers are actually a akin to a foreign power in the
Machiavellian sense, then the prescriptions of frugality Machiavelli laid out for the
domestic prince don’t apply to him. In fact, such managers have every incentive to use
the corporation’s assets for personal purposes, seeking to preserve and promote herself or
himself regardless of the state of the corporation. This view of the CEO or director under
the Machiavellian model may more accurately describe what is really going on at the
management level. But this realization is not altogether surprising. Others have already
recognized that the shareholder primacy norm, with regard to corporate governance in
general, is not a true reflection of what happens in day-to-day corporate governance.210
Indeed, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means argued (in their famous Berle-Means
thesis) that the sharp divide between corporate ownership and control has resulted in
management becoming the effective owners of a corporation.211 The implicit economic
problem, as set forth in their thesis, is that corporate managers have the potential to act in
their own self-interest or for some purpose other than profit maximization,212 a notion
that would seem to run counter to a shareholder primacy norm. Yet despite this
separation of ownership and control, the shareholder primacy norm continues to remain
the dominant theory of corporate governance.213 Indeed, corporate law scholars who
have acknowledged the flaws in the shareholder primacy norm still maintain this norm as
the ultimate goal of other models. For instance, Professor Stephen Bainbridge has
proposed a director primacy norm, which, while recognizing that the shareholder owners
do not actually control the directors, nonetheless maintains that shareholder wealth
maximization is the proper “end” of corporate governance.214
But if it is true that corporate officers and directors are in control, which clearly
seems to be the case, then is it so surprising that these same managers do not always act
in the best interest of the corporation? Be it through ignorance of the duties owed to the
corporation or due to more sinister motives, the past decade has provided numerous
instances in which self-interest has seemingly been the guiding principle of corporate
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managers.215 While the Enron debacle of the 2000s was once the most outrageous
example of executive abuses, it is not isolated.216 We have since experienced a financial
meltdown that has directly affected millions globally, but the officers and directors of
many of the responsible institutions have suffered little consequence, and in some
instances, continue to reap large bonuses.217
Accepting that corporate managers are foreign powers rather than princes, under the
Machiavellian model, these managers will place their own interests ahead of those of the
corporation. But what does this mean for CSR and its applications? In many instances,
little difference may be noticed between the Machiavellian model and the shareholder
primacy norm. This is due largely to the often convergent interests of the corporation and
the officer or director. Generally speaking, actions which benefit the corporation,
likewise benefit management. Shareholder wealth maximization offers job stability, and
because the officers and directors are often shareholders themselves, it is in their own
self-interest to pursue shareholder wealth maximization. For instance, in light of the
Citizens United decision, corporations may very well have even greater influence over
the political process and greater ability to use this influence to elect candidates who may
favor limiting the liability of corporations and its officers. While it is possible that
corporate managers will use this influence to promote their own self-interests, in many
cases those interests will dovetail with those of the corporation, and thus the
Machiavellian model will more-or-less disguise itself under the shareholder primacy
norm model. However, there remain areas where the interests of the corporation and the
interests of its managers diverge. In these instances, the Machiavellian model sometimes
takes on the guise of a Progressive point of view.
For instance, one area in which shareholder interests and management interests may
diverge is within the context of a hostile takeover. In a takeover, the offering price per
share may very well exceed the trading price, sometimes quite significantly.218 Such a
takeover bid would appear to be in the best interests of the shareholders; however, the
officers and directors may well be resistant to such a takeover, as it has the very real
potential to negatively impact their own employment or continued membership on the
board.219 Thus, corporate management may take actions such as adopting a “poison pill”
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strategy, making it much more difficult, and expensive, to complete the takeover.220
Though such actions would seem to be directly in conflict with the shareholders’
interests, the corporate law of many states are rather accommodating to such decisions,
either respecting them under the business judgment rule221 or adopting so-called “other
constituency” statutes which allow for corporate managers to take into account the
interests of other stakeholders beyond just the shareholders.222
At first blush, such statutes appear to be a nod to the progressive stakeholder model of
corporate governance. However, in reality these statutes have the potential to be used to
basically justify self-interested decisions by directors.223 Though two-thirds of the states
have adopted some form of “other constituency” statute, concern over abuse has
prompted some commentators and states to reject such proposed statutes. As, the
Corporations Committee of the State Bar of California noted in its condemnation of a
proposal to adopt such a statute:
Instead of promoting corporate social responsibility, the Committee
believes that the [proposed other constituency statute] would lead to less
director accountability, less responsive corporate governance and,
ultimately, less socially responsible corporate behavior, for the following
reasons:
• The Bill would undermine director accountability to shareholders
without effectively promoting interests of non-shareholder constituents.
• The Bill is unnecessary because current law is not an impediment to
responsible corporate behavior and there are less intrusive means of
protecting the interest of non-shareholder constituents.
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• The Bill has the potential for causing significant economic harm to
shareholders and the public generally.224
Thus, in states where constituency statutes have passed, it can be argued that this is one
area in which the self-interest of management has not only prevailed, but has done so
with the aid of state legislatures under a Progressive guise.
Another area where the Machivellian model has the potential to diverge from the
shareholder primacy norm is in the area of legal compliance. To illustrate, we return to
the ABC Corporation hypothetical from Part II., supra. Under a shareholder primacy
norm, the corporate managers should be motivated by what is in the best interests of the
corporation. Easterbrook and Fischel would argue that this requires a balancing of the
fines imposed by legal noncompliance and the risk of getting caught. However, under the
Machiavellian model, the corporate manager will worry more about the personal impact
of compliance or non-compliance rather than its impact on the corporation. If there is
little chance of personal civil or criminal liability, and legal noncompliance could lead to
higher profits, then the officer will be less diligent about ensuring legal compliance or
may be more willing to engage in activities that operate in a legal “gray” area.
From a Progressive stand-point, such behavior is offensive as it ignores the
stakeholders who are adversely affected. And though such conduct may potentially reap
benefits for the shareholders, shareholder primacy norm proponents should be equally
offended as a proper balancing of risks versus benefits has not taken place – the process
has been skewed by the self-interest of the corporate managers. While it is true that
shareholders have the ability to sue for breaches of fiduciary duties, given the difficulties
of bringing a derivative suit and the deference afforded management under the business
judgment rule, the protections offered by the prospect of such a suit will likely only be
effective in the most egregious of cases.225 This is not to say, however, that such selfinterest is the norm—we lack empirical data to stoutly support such a claim. But given
the events of the past decade, it seems beyond plausible that a Machiavellian model is at
work within the ranks of corporate management.
V. Conclusion
While The Prince was Machiavelli’s attempt to secure the good graces of the Medici
family, it was not necessarily a description of what thought was the ideal method of
governance.226 Machiavelli’s later The Discourses revealed a much more Platonic
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leaning to his feelings on governance.227 In this regard, The Prince may not have been a
work of advocacy, but a descriptive work in which Machiavelli was merely recognizing
what he saw around him.
Conversely, current legal academic debate over CSR and its proper role in the
company has reflected less of what is actually happening and more of an ideal.
Shareholder primacy proponents have advocated that the proper “end” is to maximize
shareholder wealth. While those within this camp might quibble to varying degrees over
the means to this end, the focus is undoubtedly on the “owners” of the corporation, ie. the
shareholders. In response to this school of thought, Progressives have advocated a
broader stakeholder model that takes into account the interests of all those affected by the
corporation.
Each of these schools of thought have attractive features, however, we feel that both
fail to reflect, at least to some degree, the true state of things. Thus, just as The Prince
described a model of governance perceived by Machiavelli, we believe that a
Machiavellian model more aptly describes the governance model of corporate
management, at least in some corporations and amongst some officers and directors.
This realization is not a purely academic exercise, though such a label is tempting,
particularly when relying upon such classic works. Instead, the realization and
acceptance that corporate management is operating under such a model is an important
first step in crafting laws and policies geared to achieve what we believe is the proper
role of corporate management, be it to maximize shareholder wealth or to more broadly
use corporate wealth to do good, while also doing well. Furthermore, it is an important
first step in achieving a broader goal which Google has claimed as its own corporate
creed, “Don’t be evil.”228
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